February 23, 2002

My name is David Newman. I am an industrial hygienist with the New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health (NYCOSH). NYCOSH is a private, non-profit, union-based health and safety organization located here in Manhattan. Over 200 local unions in the metropolitan area are members of NYCOSH, as are several hundred individual workplace health and safety activists, health care professionals, and workers' compensation attorneys. NYCOSH has been providing technical assistance and comprehensive training in occupational safety and health to unions, employers, government agencies, and community organizations for over twenty years.

Since the tragic events of September 11 and continuing to this day, NYCOSH has worked closely with unions, employers, non-profit organizations, immigrant, community, and tenant organizations at ground zero and throughout lower Manhattan. This work has included outdoor and indoor environmental sampling, assessment of the safety and healthfulness of affected workplaces and residences, help with design or evaluation of sampling, cleanup, and reoccupancy protocols, and technical assistance with mechanical building ventilation and filtration issues. NYCOSH serves as an information clearinghouse for area workers, unions, employers, and residents. NYCOSH, in collaboration with the Queens College Center for the Biology of Natural Systems and the Latin American Workers Project, operates a mobile medical unit near ground zero which provides free medical screenings for immigrant day laborers engaged in the cleanup of contaminated offices and residences. We have provided respirators to hundreds of area workers, along with changeout filter cartridges, fit-testing, and training in proper respirator use. In addition, NYCOSH has provided training in occupational safety and health to hundreds of area workers. NYCOSH continues to collect and evaluate environmental sampling results and other pertinent data from both public and private sources and to consult with scientific and medical experts to ensure that our information about environmental and occupational health conditions in lower Manhattan is comprehensive, accurate, and current.

I would like to begin by acknowledging the dedication of EPA personnel in their work in lower Manhattan since September 11. None of the testimony that may be heard today should in any way diminish our respect for their efforts.

Nevertheless, NYCOSH remains concerned that the response of the Environmental Protection Agency to the events of September 11 has not been adequately protective of environmental quality or of public health and has not been consistent with EPA's mission, with prior EPA emergency response operations, or with prior EPA interventions and practices. Furthermore, EPA has been the lead government agency responding to the aftermath of 9/11, and as such, the nature of its response has to a great degree shaped the nature of the response of other agencies at all levels of government.

1. Early public statements by EPA appear to ignore or contradict information which was readily available to the agency at the time. For example, EPA asserted on its website on September 21, "city residents are not being exposed to dangerous contaminants..." At the time, it was common public knowledge that extensive quantities of sprayed-on asbestos-containing fireproofing were present in the World Trade Center at the time of its collapse. Significant quantities of asbestos were likely to have been released into the environment at the time of the collapse of the twin towers and could continue to be released as excavation operations proceed. In another example, EPA collected 143 bulk (dust) samples throughout lower Manhattan in the first days after September 11. Seventy six percent had detectable levels of asbestos, of which thirty four percent contained greater than 1 percent asbestos by weight, the regulatory definition of asbestos-containing material (ACM). In a third example, information on the probable presence of toxic substances was available under the hazardous chemical storage reporting requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, codified in Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations, parts 350 - 372, sections 311 - 312. Examination of such readily available data would have indicated the possible presence of barium, lead, chloroform, chlordane, carbon tetrachloride, cadmium, chromium, mercury, hydrogen sulfide, arsenic, and other toxic substances at the United States Customs Service, 6 World Trade Center, and of mercury, tetrachloroethylene, PCBs, arsenic, ethane, and other toxic substances at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 1 World Trade Center, and thus the potential for contamination by or exposure to any of these toxic substances.

2. Public statements by EPA spokespersons downplayed the nature and the extent of environmental and health risks. For example, on September 14 EPA Administrator Christine Todd Whitman stated, "(I)t is not a health problem. We have found particulate matter in the air, but ... it is not a problem for the general population." Unfortunately, such statements may have influenced subsequent government response efforts as well as subsequent behavior by workers, employers, residents, and landlords. The message sent out by EPA was that there was no cause for concern. Consequently, in many instances, workers did not receive immediate, unequivocal, and specific instruction about personal protective equipment, including types of respirators and filters appropriate for the contaminants to which they were exposed. Respirator use even today among some ground zero workers and among most lower Manhattan cleanup workers remains at unacceptably low and unsafe levels. Landlords and employers, relying upon EPA statements, have encouraged or forced workers and tenants to return to or remain in offices and residences which, in many cases, have not been adequately tested for contaminants or appropriately cleaned or abated.

3. EPA's virtually exclusive reliance on the results of outdoor environmental sampling to characterize risk serves to underestimate indoor risk levels. For example, outdoor air monitoring may accurately measure asbestos at very low concentrations which result from the dispersion and dilution of fibers throughout the atmosphere. However, such measurements may not be reflective of conditions indoors where asbestos fibers infiltrate and do not get dispersed or diluted. Instead they settle out on surfaces, from where they may be repeatedly stirred up and distributed within buildings by human activity and mechanical ventilation systems. Continued infiltration over time of even small amounts of asbestos-containing dust may result in significantly higher indoor concentrations, thus posing exposure hazards indoors that may not be present outdoors.

4. EPA selectively applied certain provisions of the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA), which served to emphasize low levels of risk from exposure to asbestos outdoors while ignoring potentially higher levels of risk from exposure to asbestos indoors. While EPA commendably opted to apply the protective AHERA indoor asbestos clearance standard to outdoor air in lower Manhattan, it inexplicably chose not to utilize other provisions of AHERA which require indoor asbestos sampling, abatement, and aggressive clearance testing prior to reoccupancy. EPA's decision not to apply these provisions or to implement protocols based on these provisions left thousands of workers and residents in lower Manhattan without guidance or protection against indoor exposure to asbestos.

5. EPA's evaluation of risk relies almost exclusively upon results of outdoor environmental sampling. However, because EPA is not able to sample for the broad spectrum of possible contaminants, its evaluation of risk cannot be considered to be complete or final. This inability to sample adequately is not limited to EPA but is shared by all responders. The variability of the contents of the World Trade Center and the massive scale and intensity of destruction make it virtually impossible to anticipate, let alone sample, all possible resulting contaminants. For example, EPA monitored elevated isocyanate and tetrachloroethane levels near the waste transfer operation at Pier 25 on isolated occasions. EPA is not able to determine whether these results are typical or atypical, as sampling for these substances is not ongoing. Since hundreds, or conceivably thousands, of other contaminants may have been produced by the towers' collapse and by the ensuing fires, environmental sampling alone cannot provide sufficient information to adequately characterize the full extent of contamination or risk.

6. Public statements by EPA spokespersons imply that environmental monitoring results which fall below regulatory limits constitute "safe" levels of exposure. This is not always the case. To cite just one example, EPA regularly announces that test results of respirable particulate matter (PM2.5) are at levels below regulatory limits. However, the agency has not explained that these regulatory limits apply only to the aerodynamic size of the particles and not to their chemical composition. To date, EPA has not indicated that it has tested or is testing respirable particulates for chemical constituents. However, recently released test results of airborne particulate matter from the Detection and Evaluation of Long-range Transport of Aerosols (DELTA) Group at the University of California at Davis indicate that PM2.5 in lower Manhattan in the months after September 11 was contaminated with a variety of toxic substances, including metals "at the highest levels ever recorded in air in the United States." In addition, UC Davis found that most of the contaminated respirable particulate matter was smaller than PM2.5. Thus, while this fine respirable dust can present serious health risks, it is neither regulated nor monitored by EPA.

7. EPA did not utilize in lower Manhattan the aggressive emergency measures to protect public health which it has employed in previous disaster response operations. In 1989, an underground steam pipe explosion in the Gramercy Park area of Manhattan killed 3 people, injured 24, and released 200 pounds of asbestos into the general environment. Two hundred residents were evacuated for several months as EPA and NYC DEP supervised the cleanup and decontamination of their apartment buildings. Despite significantly higher levels of fatalities, injuries, evacuations, and toxic releases in lower Manhattan, EPA undertook no comparable actions subsequent to the events of September 11. In another case, EPA has spent more than $30 million in the last 2 years to decontaminate the outdoor environment in Libby, Montana, a small mining town where twenty percent of the residents have asbestos-induced lung damage. The asbestos originates in dust from an open-pit vermiculite mine on the edge of town. EPA is expected to shortly declare a public health emergency in Libby in order to gain the authority to decontaminate private homes. In lower Manhattan, by contrast, EPA has sought neither to utilize emergency powers nor to examine or decontaminate indoor spaces.

8. EPA did not initiate investigations of indoor air quality to protect public health in lower Manhattan as it has done in previous responses to health concerns. For example, in response to reports of allergy, asthma, and headache among school children in the South Bronx, in 1997 EPA conducted a comprehensive 3-month study of indoor air quality at Public School 48. EPA investigated possible indoor and outdoor sources of chemical and microbial contamination as well as the adequacy of heating and mechanical ventilation systems. EPA undertook no comparable investigations of indoor air quality in lower Manhattan subsequent to the events of September 11.

9. EPA has not provided full and open public access to environmental sampling results. The public sharing of vital government information is one of the cornerstones of the democratic process. Much important data was released to the public in late October only after a request by the New York Environmental Law and Justice Project under the Freedom of Information Act. Some of this data is still not available on the EPA web site, the main point of access for the general public. Results of ongoing EPA "grab samples" for various contaminants are also not posted to the web. In many instances, EPA has chosen to characterize sampling results rather than to share actual results with the general public, precluding independent analysis of data.

NYCOSH has recommended since shortly after September 11 that government agencies establish binding protocols for evaluation, cleanup, clearance testing, and reoccupancy of contaminated or potentially-contaminated workplaces and residences in lower Manhattan. We have recommended that the appropriate government agency or agencies require:

• indoor environmental bulk and/or air sampling of premises contaminated with visibly elevated levels of dust
  
• professionally-conducted cleanups appropriately designed to adequately remove contaminants identified by environmental sampling, including asbestos abatements by qualified and licensed asbestos abatement companies where asbestos has been identified, with required forms filed with NYC DEP
  
• clearance air sampling utilizing "aggressive" methods as called for in the AHERA standard
  
• explicit criteria for reoccupancy of buildings or areas.

Additional information on these recommendations can be found on our website, www.nycosh.org.

NYCOSH also recommends the establishment of a uniform disaster response plan, elements of which should include, in addition to those listed above:

• designation of a lead agency to coordinate response and to ensure compliance with applicable regulations
  
• coordination of federal, state and local agencies
  
• clear delineation of the role of each agency
  
• ability of each agency to act quickly and with authority in its areas of expertise
  
• pro-active planning to ensure adequate response in all sectors, including workplaces, residences, and indoor and outdoor public spaces
  
• creation of a compendium of applicable laws and regulations, including those pertaining to occupational safety and health, environmental protection, and worker and community right-to-know
  
• development of a best practices guidebook based on previous incidents
  
• establishment of protocols for:
  
  • emergency evacuation of impacted buildings and areas
    
  • environmental sampling and analysis, including collection, centralization, and dissemination of results
    
  • immediate and ongoing hazard analysis utilizing all available data, including but not limited to, results of environmental sampling, SARA Title III annual reports, toxic release inventory release reports, etc.
    
  • accumulation, storage, and emergency distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE), including respirators
    
  • on-site, emergency, short duration respirator training and fit-testing, followed as soon as possible by full training
    
  • ongoing communication between response agencies and affected parties
    
  • a central personnel registry to track workers, volunteers, and exposed or otherwise affected persons
    
  • coordination and funding of immediate and long-term medical response and surveillance by government agencies and medical institutions.

It is essential that we learn from the tragic events of September 11. It is now five months since the attack on the Trade Center. Unfortunately, there is nothing we can do to bring back those we have lost. However, as more information becomes available and as we assess the strengths and deficiencies of our response, there is much we can do to prevent further harm to those who may still be at risk. And, should the unthinkable reoccur, we must be better prepared to protect public health and environmental quality.

Thank you for this opportunity to make our views known.

NYCOSH's 9/11-related work is conducted in partnership with the United Church of Christ's National Disaster Ministries, with additional support from the September 11th Fund created by the United Way of New York City and the New York Community Trust.